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In the alternative, should this case be remanded
District

Court

for

a

determination

of

the

jurisdictional issues regarding Defendant's Indian status and
whether the crime was committed in Indian country?
3.

Should the Defendant be allowed to withdraw his

guilty plea from the charge of second degree murder, a first
degree felony, for the reason that he did not knowingly and
voluntarily enter that plea?
As to issues one and two above, the standard of review
is whether the District Court was without jurisdiction in
accepting the guilty plea and entering judgment against the
Defendant, or whether the case should be remanded to the
District Court for a determination as to the jurisdictional
issues.
The standard of review with regard to the issue of
whether the Defendant should be allowed to withdraw his guilty
plea, is whether it clearly appears from the record as a whole
that the trial Court abused its discretion in refusing to
allow Defendant to withdraw a guilty plea which was entered
without complying with Utah R. Crim. P. 11(e), Utah Code Ann.
Section 77-35-11.
CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS
Any

relevant

text

of
2

constitutional

provisions,

statutes, or rules pertinent to the resolution of the Issues
presented on. appeal i s contained i n the body of this brief.
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where he was bound over for trial ir rh:- eighth Judicial
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District Court.
On April 2, 1985, Defendant appeared together with his
counsel in the Eighth Judicial District Court and entered a
plea of guilty to second degree murder, a first degree felony,
pursuant to a negotiated plea upon an amended information.
Defendant did not raise the jurisdictional issue relating to
his Indian status at that time because the same judge who had
denied a hearing of those issues sat to take Defendant's plea.
There was no written plea affidavit and the plea was entered
pursuant to the colloquy reflected
Addendum.

in Exhibit 4 of the

The Court accepted Defendant's guilty plea to the

amended information. A motion to withdraw his plea of guilty
on the basis that it was not knowingly and voluntarily made
was denied by the Court pursuant to a decision made on April
2, 1990.

(See Exhibit 5 in the Addendum.)

Defendant appeals from the April 2, 1990, decision and
from the Court's denial of his challenge to the jurisdiction
of the Court based on his claim to Indian status and claim
that the crime occurred in Indian country.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
State v. Hagen 802 P. 2d 745 (Utah App. 1990) holds
that the State has the burden to show that it has jurisdiction
based on claims of Indian status of defendants and the situs
of the crime.

Defendant and his counsel raised these issues

at his arraignment and at the March 13, 1985 preliminary
4

hearing :..••the bn

-* denied ^ hearing.
;

. *

Cin~e the Jr.au has

ericd:ic^ <~r.^i issues pursuant te

the Ha gen case

,:•.«...

reversed a ^ -^- ^ r^

should bo dismissed,

' '' '

.

-

•*

net reversed

Scat , . , a^>,. u _

- failure ; - w
^ ?dictic >

* —: - e . - ^ > •

justice , th-^ u. :L,.I

"'"fendar4" \ <-

w,

-it"u?r

juraen

fairnes

. .^^ .

for hearir- ef these "urisdictional issues,
^

as amended require -eric - ., ,
Mnt"i1 --;•.transcript

"

^;IJ;J U .

.

,.

1

A review zt

thi

* <-

^

^

••

' ^ r

accept a pi _

— m r i ^ ^ r r . ^ ^-:+-rv t--a- r< o.

are GGr':cu; deficiencies
R__..

ude Ann. /T-*^-" 1

i r. Mio Court record with regard ••">

• - extent t h e : -hir Court shcu: i fine

that v u pica was not

w,*.,.^

_.

Defendant should be allowed to withdraw his guilty plea,
(1L.IL i^H

M

L' 11 "I"

POINT I.
DEFENDANT'c; CONVICTION SHOULD BF REVERSED FOR FAILURE
,:F THE: STATE TO ESTABLISH
Jr'RI9DTnwT^;
The

ISGUC

•

ir1. ictior. may *e ,a.ced

Tn th: e* c.: ^ " r h ^ *.v :-. i-.i-:

-

••

i.
* *~!~

"'*
^ue

<"f jurisdiction er h: - arraignment and it tnt ^r t ^ . ^ ...-. .ng
, I ^ O J ; in tAio Eighth Circuit ::,ir4:
5

of Uintah County, Utah, but no hearing was allowed by the
Court as to Defendant's Indian status and whether the crime
occurred in Indian country.

The failure of the State to

sustain its burden, and the failure of the Court to make a
determination as to jurisdiction was occasioned in part by the
fact that Eighth Circuit Court Judge Whitney D. Hammond
excused himself soon after the hearing began because of a
vehicle accident in which his daughter was involved and Judge
Richard C. Davidson sat as judge pro tempore for the balance
of the hearing.
Exhibit A

Defendant's Affidavit attached hereto as

in the Addendum

clearly demonstrates

that he

attempted to have the Court resolve the issue of jurisdiction
and that his attorney also attempted to have the issue of
jurisdiction resolved.

There is no existing record of the

March IS, 1985 hearing because the tape which was used to
transcribe the hearing in the Eighth Judicial Circuit Court
has been erased as is indicated in the Eighth Circuit Court
Clerk's

affidavit

attached

hereto

as

Exhibit

2 in the

Addendum. By a preponderance of the evidence it is clear that
the issue was raised before the Court.
Under the law of the State of Utah, the State has the
burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that the
Defendant is not an Indian and that the crime did not occur
in Indian country.

State v, Sorenson, 758 P. 2d 477, 469-70

(Utah App. 1988) and State v^ Haaen 802 P. 2d 745 (Utah App.
6

1990).

In Hagen, the Court held that the State's failure to

meet its burden in showing that the defendant was non-Indian
required reversal and discharge of the defendant even if the
State's failure to introduce evidence stemmed from a good
faith mistake on the part of the prosecution as to who had the
burden on the issue.
Since the State of Utah in this case failed to meet
its jurisdictional burden regarding the Indian status of the
Defendant and the situs of the crime, his conviction should
be reversed and the case should be dismissed.

At the time of

the entry of Defendant's plea, the issue of jurisdiction was
not raised on the record for the reason that Judge Richard C.
Davidson, who heard most of the preliminary hearing, also sat
to take the plea, and since he had previously denied their
requests to adjudicate these issues, Defendant and his Counsel
did net raise them again.
POINT II.
IN THE ALTERNATIVE, AT A MINIMUM, THIS CASE SHOULD BE
REMANDED FOR A HEARING OF THE JURISDICTIONAL ISSUE
Defendant has substantial and extensive argument to
support his position that the State of Utah does not have
jurisdiction in this case based on his Indian status and the
occurrence of the crime within Indian country so that the
Federal

Courts

should

have

exclusive

U.S.C.s. Section 1152 which states that:
7

jurisdiction

under

Except as otherwise expressly provided by law, the
general laws of the United States as to the punishment
of offenses committed in any place within the sole and
exclusive jurisdiction of the United States, except the
District of Columbia, shall extend to the Indian Country.
This section shall not extend to offenses committed by
one Indian against the person or property of another
Indian, nor to any Indian committing any offense in the
Indian country who has been punished by the local law of
the Tribe, or to any case where, by treaty stipulations,
the exclusive jurisdiction over such offenses is, or may
be, secured to the Indian tribes respectively.
Part of Defendant's argument would be as follows:
1.

It is clear that all of Uintah County, prior to

statehood, was Indian country and was occupied historically
by various bands of the Ute Indian Tribe, including the Uintah
Band, for hundreds of years prior to Utah's statehood. (For
example, see Exhibit 3 in the Addendum.)
2.

When Utah became a State in 1896, as part of the

Utah State Constitution, Article 3 Ordinance 2 required the
citizens of the State of Utah to disclaim forever their
jurisdiction over Indians in Indian country.

That provision

reads as follows:
The people inhabiting this State do affirm and declare
that they forever disclaim all right and title to the
unappropriated public lands lying within the boundaries
hereof, and to all lands lying within said limits owned
or held by any Indian or Indian tribes, and that until
the title thereto shall have been extinguished by the
United States, the same shall be and remain subject to
the disposition of the United States, and said Indian
lands shall remain under the absolute jurisdiction and
control of the Congress of the United States.

8

3.

Ordinance

2

Article

3

of

the

Utah

State

Constitution has never been repealed and certainly was not
repealed when

the Land Allotment Act of

1905 was made

effective where certain lands were withdrawn from the original
reservation

boundaries

for

settlement.

In

this

case,

Defendant is not raising an issue of fee simple ownership of
the lands that were withdrawn, but asserts that the disclaimer
of Article 3 Ordinance 2 was not rescinded as it relates to
Indian jurisdiction regarding crimes.

It is clear that all

of Uintah County was recognized as part of the original Indian
country prior to statehood.
In the event that the conviction of the Defendant is
not

reversed

for

failure

of

the

State

to

establish.

jurisdiction, the matter should be remanded to the District
Court for a determination cf the jurisdictional issues, part
of which are summarized by Defendant above.
POINT THREE.
DEFENDANT SHOULD BE ALLOWED TO WITHDRAW HIS
GUILTY PLEA FROM THE CHARGE OF SECOND DEGREE MURDER,
A FIRST DEGREE FELONY, FOR THE REASON HE DID NOT
KNOWINGLY AND VOLUNTARILY ENTER THAT PLEA
The statute governing Defendant's plea, Utah Code Ann.
Section 77-13-6 (1982) provides that a plea of guilty may be
withdrawn as follows:
Withdrawal of Plea. A plea of
be withdrawn at any time prior
A plea of guilty or no contest
withdrawn only upon good cause
9

not guilty may
to conviction.
may be
shown and with

leave of Court.
The taking of criminal guilty pleas is governed by
Utah R. Crim. P. 11(e), Utah Code Ann- Section 77-35-ll(e)
(Supp. 1988) which provides as follows:
(3) The court may refuse to accept a plea of
guilty or no contest and shall not accept such
a plea until the court has made the findings:
(1) That if the defendant is not
represented by counsel he has knowingly waived
his right to counsel and does not desire
counsel;
(2) That the plea is voluntarily made;
(3) That the defendant knows he has
rights against compulsory self-incrimination,
to a jury trial and to confront and crossexamine in open court the witnesses against
him, and that by entering the plea he waives
all of those rights;
(4) That the defendant understands the
nature and elements of the offense to which he
is entering the plea; that upon trial the
prosecution would have the burden of proving
each of those elements beyond a reasonable
doubt; and that the plea is an admission of
all those elements;
(5) That the defendant knows the minimum
and maximum sentence that may be imposed upon
him for each offense to which a plea is
entered, including the possibility of the
imposition of consecutive sentences; and
(6) Whether the tendered plea is a result
of a prior plea discussion and plea agreement
and if so, what agreement has been reached.
There was no written plea bargain affidavit in this
case.

A summary of the deficiencies noted in the colloquy

(Transcript, Exhibit 4 of the Addendum) is set forth as
10

follows:
1.

The trial judge failed to advise Defendant of the

entire statutory charge in the amended information• (See
Transcript page 3, Exhibit 4 of the Addendum.

Also see Judge

Payne's decision page 4, lines 3 through 6, Exhibit 5 of the
Addendum.)
2.

The Court did not ask if the Defendant knew that

a guilty plea is an admission of all of the elements of the
crime, and no findings were entered.
3.
a

The Court did not ask the Defendant if he had had

sufficient opportunity

to discuss his rights and the

consequences of his guilty plea with his attorney.
4. The Court did net advise the Defendant that he had
the right to have witnesses subpoenaed on his behalf at
State's expense to testify at the time of trial.
5. The Court did not advise the Defendant that he had
a right to testify in his own behalf but if he chose not to
do so he could not be compelled to testify or give evidence
against himself.

He was not advised that if he did not want

to testify the jury would be told that no inference adverse
to him could be drawn from his failure to testify.

In short,

Defendant

Amendment

was

not

advised

as

to

his

Fifth

Constitutional rights, and no findings were entered.
6.

Defendant was not advised that if he could not

afford to pay the costs for any appeal that those costs,
11

including attorney's fees, would be paid for by the State.
7.

At the time the Defendant initially entered his

plea of guilty and the Court accepted his guilty plea and
found that it was knowingly made, Defendant had not yet been
advised that the sentence was for not less than five years nor
more than life in the Utah State Penitentiary and could also
carry a fine of up to $10,000.00.

It is true that the Court

attempted to cover that omission but that advice was not given
prior to the entry of a plea.
8.

Following a recitation of the conduct of the

Defendant, the Court became concerned about the factual basis
for the plea and advised the Defendant that based on his
statement of the facts, the County Attorney would have a
difficult time making out a case of second degree murder. The
Defendant responded he just did not want to take the case
through trial.

(See Addendum, Exhibit 4, page 12, line 17.)

This statement should have caused the Court tc conduct a much
more thorough colloquy with regard to Defendant's rights.
9. There was no inquiry as to the age of the Defendant
and his ability to read and understand the English language.
Neither was there any inquiry nor findings regarding whether
the Defendant was under the influence of drugs, medication or
intoxicants when the decision to enter the plea was made.
There was no inquiry nor findings as to whether the Defendant
suffered from any mental condition which affected his ability
12

to understand what he was doing at the time of the plea or
what he was doing when the decision to enter the plea was
made.
10.

Defendant was not advised that because he was on

parole that the entry of his plea in the case at hand may
result in consecutive sentences being imposed.
In State of Utah v*. Gibbons, 740 P. 2d 1309 (Utah
1987), this Court examined the requirements of Rule 11(e).
In

remanding

the

appeal,

this

Court

enunciated

the

requirements of accepting a guilty plea, and placed the burden
of meeting these requirements on the trial court:
Rule 11(e) squarely places on trial courts the burden of
ensuring that Constitutional and Rule 11(e) requirements
are complied with when a guilty plea is entered. The basis
for that duty is found in Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238,
243, 244,...where the United States Supreme Court stated:
"What is at stake for an accused facing [punishment]
demands the utmost solicitude of which courts are capable
in canvassing the matter with the accused to make sure he
has full understanding of what the plea connotes and its
consequence". Id. at 1312.
Citing Henderson v. Morganf 426 U.S. 637 (1976), the
Court in Gibbons adopted the Henderson standard, requiring
more than a reliance on the Defense Counsel's explanation of
the law to the facts of the case.
[I]t is too late in the day to permit a guilty plea to
be entered against a defendant solely on the consent of
the Defendant's agent-his lawyer.
Our cases make
absolutely clear that the choice to plead guilty must be
defendant's; it is he who must be informed of the
consequences of his plea and what it is he waives when
he pleads, Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, ... and it
13

is in his admission that he is in fact guilty that his
conviction will rest.
The Court further held that:
Because of the importance of compliance with Rule 11(e)
and Boykin, the law places the burden of establishing
compliance with those requirements on the trial judge.
It is not sufficient to assume that defense attorneys
make sure that their clients fully understand the
contents of the affidavit. Id. at 1313.
Counsel for the State asserts that the Utah Supreme
Court has adopted

the

"record

as a whole" approach

in

reviewing the validity of guilty pleas under Rule 11(e) as set
forth in Warner v. Morris, 709 P. 2d 309 (Utah 1985); Brooks
v^ Morris, 709 P. 2d 310 (Utah 1986); and State v^. Miller,
718 P. 2d 403 (Utah 1986).

In this case the State would ask

the Court to look at voluntary statements of James F. Gardner,
affidavits of defense counsel, and other information outside
of the plea hearing transcript.

In Judge Payne's decision,

he also relied on information outside of the plea hearing
transcript and held that the failure of Judge Davidson to
advise the Defendant of his Constitutional right against selfincrimination was satisfied by the fact that he had been given
his Miranda warnings by police officers en two occasions at
the time of his arrest.

Clearly Rule 11(e) and State v.

Gibbons require that the trial court judge ensures that
Constitutional and Rule 11(e) requirements are met during the
plea hearing.

14

The transcript of the plea hearing clearly shows that the
trial court judge failed to comply adequately with Rule 11(e)
and other Constitutional requirements in accepting Defendant's
plea.

The April 2, 1990 Decision of Judge A. Lynn Payne

should be reversed, and Defendant

should be allowed to

withdraw his guilty plea.
CONCLUSION
Because Defendant did not have the opportunity for a
hearing on jurisdictional issues relating to his Indian status
and the situs of the crime being in Indian country, his
conviction should either be reversed or the case remanded to
the District Court for a hearing of the jurisdictional issues.
Defendant should also be allowed to withdraw his guilty plea
from the charge of second degree murder, a first degree
felony, for

the

reason

that

he

did

not

knowingly

and

voluntarily enter that plea as is evidenced by the trial
court's failure to comply adequately with Constitutional
requirements and Utah R. Crim. P. 11(e) Utah Code Ann. Section
77-35-11 and the standards articulated by this Court with
regard to those requirements.
RESPECTFULLY submitted this 22nd day of April, 1992.

Kenneth ^JSAndertbn
"
Attorney for Defendant-Appellant
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that on the 22nd day of April, 1992, I
mailed first class, postage prepaid, four (4) true and correct
copies of the forgoing Supplemental Brief of Appellant to
David B. Thompson, Assistant Attorney General, 236 State
Capitol, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114.

16

ADDENDUM
Exhibit 1

KENNETH G. ANDERTON #0116
Attorney for Defendant
110 East 100 South
Vernal, Utah 84078
Telephone 789-2770
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,
vs.

AFFIDAVIT

JAMES F. GARDNER,
Case No. 900225
Defendant,
STATE OF UTAH

)
) ss.
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE )
James F. Gardner, being first duly sworn, deposes and
says that:
1.
2.

I am the affiant in the above entitled matter.
I am presently

incarcerated

in the Utah State

Penitentiary and prior to said incarceration was a life long
resident of the Uintah Basin within the original boundaries
of the Uintah and Ouray Indian Reservation of the State of
Utah.
3.

I am a descendant of Carma Colleen Reed Gardner and

Darrell A. Gardner and based on the blood percentage criteria
believe that I am entitled to enrollment in the Ute Indian
Tribe.

4. On or about March 8, 1985, I was arrested on the Ute
Mountain

Indian

Reservation

of

Southern

Colorado

and

transported to Montezuma County Jail in Vail, Colorado, and
later to Uintah County, Utah, and was charged with murder in
the second degree under U.C.A. 76-5-203 1953 as amended.
5.

Upon arrest, I protested the jurisdiction of the

State of Utah to initiate criminal proceedings and informed
Chief William Kellogg and other tribal officers that I should
be under tribal and federal jurisdiction.

Even though there

was some communication with Chief Lloyd Arrochis and other
officers of the Ute Indian Tribal Police Department, I was
extradited to Uintah County, Utah. On March 8, 1985, Vernal
City Police Chief Robert C. Downard transported me and I,
again, informed him that I should be under federal and tribal
jurisdiction.
6.

On or about March 12, 1985, I was arraigned in the

Eighth Judicial Circuit Court in Uintah County, Utah with
Judge Whitney D. Hammond presiding.
jurisdiction

of the State of Utah to

I again challenged
initiate criminal

proceedings based on my Indian status. Nothing resulted from
my jurisdictional challenge.
7.

Between the dates of March 12 to 18 of 1985 I was

represented by attorney at law, Lance Wilkerson who was the
2

Public Defender for Uintah County at that time.
to urge the jurisdictional question.

I asked him

He did not pursue the

matter as I requested.
8.

As the Preliminary Hearing proceeded on March 18,

1985, approximately fifteen minutes into the proceeding recess
was taken and based upon an accident involving Judge Hammond's
daughter, he recused himself from the case and District Court
Judge Richard C. Davidson replaced Judge Hammond where, again,
I asked the State to remove the case to Federal Court based
on the Indian jurisdiction issue, but my court appointed
attorney, Lance Wilkerson, did not pursue the issue.
9.

On or about March 21, 1985, I received appointed

counsel, Anthony J. Famulary to replace Lance Wilkerson.
While some informal and preliminary attempts were made by my
attorney, Anthony J. Famulary, to contest the jurisdiction
issue, no formal hearing was ever held nor was the issue
properly brought before the Court.
10.

I have since made inquiry as to the availability of

a transcript of the Court proceedings and am informed that the
Eighth Judicial Circuit Court no longer has the tapes of the
March 18, 1985, hearing since it is their practice to erase
the tapes and reuse them after a reasonable period of time.
An affidavit from the Circuit Court Clerk accompanies this
3

affidavit indicating that she has made diligent inquiry and
the tape is no longer available•
11.

Based upon the fact that the issue of Indian status

and federal jurisdiction was never appropriately heard and
adjudicated by the Court, I respectfully ask that I be given
a hearing regarding said issue,

Jd*,

DATED t h i s , - -ZJZCL
y ^ ~ d a y of^EH^, 1991

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this

X

Kt.
day of-Juse^

1991.

C

My commission expires:%*\^^

ry Public
Notary
NOTARY PUBLIC
Commission Expires
August 1,1994

CUNTS-FRiEL
14000 Pony Express Rd.
Draper, Utah 84020
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MAY3I
CfiCui:

mi

KENNETH G. ANDERTON #0116
Attorney for Defendant
110 East 100 South
Vernal, Utah 84078
Telephone 789-2770
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,
CLERK'S AFFIDAVIT

vs.
JAMES F. GARDNER,

)

Case No. 900225
Defendant,
Cheryl Weeks, being first duly sworn, deposes and says:
1.

She is the Clerk of the Circuit Court with its

primary location in Vernal, Utah.
2. The Defendant, by and through his attorney, has made
a request of the Court for a transcript of the hearing held
on March 18, 1985.
3.

The proceedings of the Eighth Circuit Court are

transcribed on electronic equipment and the tapes on which the
proceedings are recorded are held for a certain length of time
consistent with the guidelines of Circuit Courts in the State
of Utah.
4.
1985

are

The tapes which would have recorded the hearings in
no

longer

available

and, consequently,

it is

impossible to make a transcript of the hearing requested by
the Defendant.
DATED this ^\9r

day of May, 1991.

CheryM Weeks

2
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Exhibit 3

JITE INOIAN TERRITORY
ca.!850

UTE PEOPLE
AN HISTORICAL STUDY
Complied by
June Lyman and Norma Denver
Third Edition
Uintah School District and The Western History Center
University of Utah
Salt Lake City, Utah
1970
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Exhibit 4

uniuinnu
IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UINTAH COUT
STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,
PLAINTIFF,

REPORTER!S_TRANS_CRIPT
OF HEARING

VS.
JAMES FRANKLIN GARDNER,
DEFENDANT.

CASE NO. 85 CR 23

BE IT REMEMBERED, THAT ON THE 2ND DAY OF
APRIL, 1985, COMMENCING AT THE HOUR OF 10:30 A.M., THE
ABOVE-ENTITLED MATTER CAME ON FOR HEARING IN THE
DISTRICT COURTROOM OF THE UINTAH COUNTY COURTHOUSE,
VERNAL, UTAH; SAID CAUSE BEING HEARD BY THE HONORABLE
RICHARD C. DAVIDSON, JUDGE IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL
DISTRICT, STATE OF UTAH.

A P P E A R A N C E S

FOR THE STATE

MARK W. NASH, ESQ.
UINTAH COUNTY ATTORNEY
319 WEST 100 SOUTH
VERNAL, UTAH 8 407 8

FOR THE DEFENDANT

ANTHONY J
ATTORNEY
8 0 SOUTH Mil
ROOSEVELT, UT|M4 34 ^6

4oo X AJ

P R O C E E D I N G S

3

THE COURT:

ITEXT IS 85-CR-28, STATE OF UTAH

4

VS. JAMES F.

5

COURT, MR. GARDNER HAVING WAIVED PRELIMINARY HEARING

6

THIS MORNING, AND COMING UP HERE FOR THE PURPOSE OF

7

ARRAIGNMENT.

8

Q.

9

GARDNER.

THIS MATTER IS BEFORE THE

(BY THE COURT)

THIS BEING AN ARRAIGNMENT, IT

IS NECESSARY THAT I ASK YOU SOME QUESTIONS, MR.

10

GARDNER.

11

TRUE AND CORRECT NAME?

FIRST OF ALL IS JAMES FRANKLIN GARDNER YOUR

12

YES, SIR

13

ARE YOU KNOWN BY ANY OTHER NAMES?

14

NO, SIR.

15

Q.

FOR THE RECORD, MR. GARDNER, ARE YOU

16

SUFFERING FROM THE EFFECTS OF ANY ALCOHOL OR DRUGS AT

17

THIS TIME?

18

NO, SIR

19

Q

DO YOU KNOW WHAT THIS PROCEEDING IS?

20

A.

YES, SIR

21

Q.

YOU UNDERSTAND YOU ARE GOING TO BE CALLED

22

UPON TO ENTER A PLEA OF GUILTY OR NOT GUILTY TO THIS

23

CHARGE THIS MORNING?

24
25

A.

YES, SIR.
THE COURT:

I TAKE IT WE ARE GOTHR FnPwaon

1

ON THE AMENDED COMPLAINT, MR. NASH?

2
3

MR. NASH:
Q.

THAT'S CORRECT, YOUR HONOR.

(BY THE COURT)

YOU UNDERSTAND, MR. GARDNER,

4

THAT THE AMENDED INFORMATION CHARGES YOU WITH THE

5

CRIME OF MURDER IN THE SECOND DEGREE, CHARGING YOU

6

WITH INTENTIONALLY OR KNOWINGLY CAUSING THE DEATH OF

7

ANOTHER, OR YOU COMMITTED AN ACT WHICH WAS DANGEROUS

8

TO HUMAN LIFE, WHICH DID IN FACT CAUSE THE DEATH OF

9

ANOTHER, OR ACTING UNDER CIRCUMSTANCES EVIDENCING A

10

DEPRAVED INDIFFERENCE TO HUMAN LIFE, AND ENGAGED IN

11

CONDUCT WHICH CAUSED THE DEATH OF ANOTHER.

12

UNDERSTAND THAT CHARGE?

DO YOU

13

A.

YES, SIR.

14

Q.

ARE YOU PREPARED TO ENTER A PLEA OF GUILTY OR

15

NOT GUILTY AT THIS TIME?

16

A.

YES

17

Q.

WHAT PLEA DO YOU INTEND TO ENTER?

18

A.

GUILTY.

19

Q.

BEFORE THE COURT CAN ACCEPT A GUILTY PLEA,

20

MR. GARDNER, YOU MUST BE ADVISED OF YOUR RIGHTS.

YOUR

21

COUNSEL WILL DO THAT ON THE RECORD AT THIS TIME.

I'M

22

SURE HE HAS ALREADY DONE IT TO YOU BEFORE.

23

YES, SIR.

24

MR. FAMULARY:

25

MR. GARDNER, YOU ARE ENTITLED

TO HAVE A SPEEDY TRIAL IN THIS MATTER.

YOU WILL BE

ENTITLED TO

VE A TRIAL BEFORE A JU

YOU ALSO HAVE

THE RIGHT TO PARTICIPATE III THE SELECTION OF THAT
JURY, AND YOU HAVE THE RIGHT TO CROSS-EXAMINE ALL THE
WITNESSES YOU HAVE AT THE TIME OF TRIAL, INCLUDING
POLICE OFFICERS OP. WHOEVER.
YOU HAVE THE RIGHT TO APPEAL THE DECISION
THAT COMES OUT OF THAT TRIAL.

IF YOU PLEAD GUILTY YOU

ARE WAIVING ALL OF THOSE RIGHTS.

DO YOU UNDERSTAND

THAT?
THE WITNESS:
Q.

YES.

{3Y THE COURT)

YOU UNDERSTAND, MR. GARDNER,

THAT YOU HAVE A PRESUMPTION OF BEING INNOCENT UNTIL*
PROVEN GUILTY BY ALL EIGHT JURORS.

ALL EIGHT JURORS

HAVE TO 3S CONVINCED OF YOUR GUILT 3EFORE YOU CAN BE
FOUND GUILTY.

IF ONE OF THEM SAYS NO, YOU ARE NOT

GOING TO BE FOUND GUILTY.

DO YOU UNDERSTAND THAT?

A.

YES, SIR.

Q.

DO YOU UNDERSTAND ALSO THAT THE BURDEN DURING

THIS ENTIRE PROCEEDING IS ON THE STATE?

THEY HAVE TO

GO FORWARD AND PROVE EACH AND EVERY ELEMENT OF THE
OFFENSE BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT?
A.

YES, SIR.

Q.

YOUR COUNSEL AMD YOU DON'T HAVE TO DO

ANYTHING.

THEY HAVE THE BURDEN OF GOING FORWARD, AND

IF THEY FAIL IN THEIR BURDEN IN ANY WAY THEN YOU ARE

1

NOT GOING TO BE FOUND GUILTY.

DO YOU UNDERSTAND THAT?

2

A.

YES

3

Q.

NOW , YOU HAVE HAD THE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL

4

»

ALL THE WAY THROUGH THIS PROCEEDING, HAVE YOU NOT'?

5

A.

YES

6

Q.

ARE YOU SATISFIED WITH HIS SERVICES?

7

A.

YES

8

Q.

YOU UNDERSTAND THAT YOU WOULD ALSO HAVE THE

9

ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL -- THE RIGHT TO HAVE THE

10

ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL ON THE APPEAL LEVEL AND THE

11

TRIAL, OF COURSE?

12

A.

YES

13

Q.

AND NOBODY CAN TAKE THAT AWAY FROM YOU, DO

14

IYOU UNDERSTAND THAT?

15

YES

16

HAS ANYBODY PROMISED YOU ANYTHING, MR

17

GARDNER?

18

NO, SIR

19

IN ORDER TO GET YOU TO MAKE THIS PLEA?

20
21
22
23

A.

NO, SIR.
THE COURT:

THERE ARE SOME OTHER CHARGES

PENDING, AS I UNDERSTAND
MR. NASH:

IT?

YOUR HONOR, FOR THE STATE I WOULD

24

REPRESENT THAT THERE HAVE BEEN SOME CONCESSIONS MADE

25

RELATING TO A THREE-COUNT THIRD DEGREE FELONY FORGERY

1

CASE THAT HAS BEEN FILED IN CIRCUIT COURT AND IS

2

PENDING IN THAT COURT AT THIS TIME.

3

GARDNER'S ENTRY OF A PLEA TO THE CHARGE CONTAINED IN

4

THIS INFORMATION THE STATE WILL DISMISS THOSE CHARGES.

5

ALSO , THE STATE IS FOREGOING THE FILING OF A

FOLLOWING MR.

6

CHARGE OF FIRST DEGREE MURDER IN THIS CASE.

7

ADDITION TO THAT THE STATE IS FOREGOING THE FILING OF

8

AN AUTO THEFT CHARGE AND A POSSIBLE HABITUAL

9

CHARGE, WHICH THAT AUTO THEFT CHARGE MAY ALLOW OR MAY

IN

CRIMINAL

10

HAVE ALLOWED.

11

STATE HAS MADE

12

CONCERNING THI S IMMEDIATE CASE, AND THERE WILL BE NO

13

RECOMMENDATION AS FAR AS LENIENCY IN SENTENCING, AND

14

NONE HAVE BEEN PROMISED.

15
16

Q.

THOSE ARE THE CONCESSIONS THAT THE
THERE HAVE BEEN NO CONCESSIONS

(BY THE COURT)

DO YOU UNDERSTAND WHAT'S BEEN

STATED BY THE COUNTY ATTORNEY, MR. GARDNER?

17

A.

YES .

18

Q.

AND IS IT YOUR UNDERSTANDING THAT THOSE

19

AGREEMENTS HAVE BEEN MADE WITH YOU?

20

A.

YES .

21

Q.

HAVE THERE BEEN ANY OTHER AGREEMENTS WHICH

22

HAVE NOT BEEN DISCLOSED THAT HAVE BEEN MADE WITH YOU?

23

A.

NO, SIR.

24

Q.

HAS ANYBODY THREATENED YOU IN ANY WAY TO GET

25

YOU TO MAKE THIS PLEA AGAINST YOURSELF?

1

NO.

2

ARE YOU MAKING THIS PLEA OF YOUR OWN FREE

3
4

WILL AND CHOICE?
A.

ARE YOU MAKING THIS PLEA BECAUSE YOU ARE IN

5
6

YES

FACT GUILTY OF MURDER IN THE SECOND DEGREE?

7

YES .

8

Q.

WHAT DID YOU DO?

9

A.

WHAT DID I DO?

10
11

YES
A.

12
13

I BET .ilM
DID YOU DO THAT TO INTENTIONALLY CAUSE HIS

DEATH?

14

A.

NO

15

Q.

DID YOU DO IT AS AN ACT CLEARLY DANGEROUS TO

16

HUMAN LIFE THAT CAUSED HIM TO DIE?

17
18

NO.
Q.

DID YOU ENGAGE IN CONDUCT WHICH CREATED A

19

GRAVE RISK OF DEATH TO ANOTHER, AND THAT THEREFORE

20

CAUSED DEATH?

21

YES

22

Q.

THAT'S WHAT YOU DID?

23

A.

YES.

24

Q.

SO YOU ARE MAKING THIS PLEA BECAUSE YOU ARE

25

IN FACT GUILTY OF MURDER IN THE SECOND DEGREE?

1

A.

YES, SIR.

2

Q.

MR. GARDNER, TO THE CHARGE OF MURDER IN THE

3

SECOND DEGREE, AS ALLEGED IN THE AMENDED COMPLAINT

4

OCCURED ON OR ABOUT MARCH 6, 1985, WHAT IS YOUR PLEA?

5

A.

6
7

GUILTY.
THE COURT:

THE COURT WILL ACCEPT YOUR GUILTY

PLEA AND FIND IT KNOWINGLY MADE.

8

WHAT ARE YOUR DESIRES AS TO SENTENCING?

9

MR. FAMULARY:

YOUR HONOR, WE DESIRE

10

SENTENCING TO BE MADE TODAY.

11

ON PAROLE FROM THE OREGON STATE PRISON IN SALEM,

12

OREGON AND FEELS IT IS IN HIS BEST INTEREST TO WAIVE

13

ALL TIME PERIODS CONCERNED THEREIN.

14

Q.

(BY THE COURT)

MR. GARDNER IS ALREADY

YOU UNDERSTAND, MR. GARDNER,

15

THAT YOU HAVE THE RIGHT TO BE SENTENCED NOT SOONER

16

THAN TWO DAYS NOR MORE THAN 30 DAYS FROM TODAY?

17

A.

YES, SIR.

18

Q.

IS IT YOUR DESIRE THAT I GO AHEAD AND IMPOSE

19

SENTENCE TODAY?
YES, SIR

20
21
22
13

Q
FROM NOW?
A.

4
5

YOU WAIVE YOUR RIGHT TO BE SENTENCED TWO DAYS

YES.
YOU WERE ON PAROLE AT THE TIME THIS WAS

COMMITTED?

1

A.

YES, SIR.

2

Q.

WHAT WAS YOUR PREVIOUS OFFENSE?

3

A.

WELL, I HAD A NUMBER OF NARCOTIC CHARGES THAT

4

WERE DROPPED ON THAT I PLEAD GUILTY TO TRANSPORTING

5

STOLEN AUTOS ACROSS STATE LINES.

6

Q.

THEFT CHARGES, THEN?

7

A.

YES.

8

THE COURT:

9

MR. NASH:

MR. NASH?
THAT'S MY UNDERSTANDING, IT WAS

10

AN AUTO THEFT CHARGE.

11

A FEDERAL CHARGE, IS MY UNDERSTANDING.

12

THE COURT:

13

MR. NASH:

14

IT WAS A STATE CHARGE, NOT

ALL RIGHT.
ALTHOUGH THE LANGUAGE HE USED

WOULD HAVE BROUGHT HIM UNDER THE FEDERAL STATUTE.

15

THE COURT:

16

MR. NASH:

ALL RIGHT.
YOUR HONOR, IF I MAY, IT WOULD BE

17

THE STATE'S RECOMMENDATION IN THIS THAT NOTHING

18

OF MAXIMUM BE IMPOSED, FIVE TO LIFE IN THE STATE

19

PENITENTIARY.

20

ANOTHER INDIVIDUAL THAT WAS DONE UNDER THE

21

CIRCUMSTANCES THAT HE HAS DESCRIBED, A SEVERE BEATING,

22

AND I FEEL IT WOULD BE IN APPROPRIATE FOR ANYTHING

23

SHORT OF THE MANDATORY -- OF THE MAXIMUM TO BE

24

IMPOSED.

25

Q.

SHORT

HE ADMITTED CAUSING THE DEATH OF

(BY THE COURT)

WE DIDN'T ASK YOU THAT,

1

MR. GARDNER.

PERHAPS WE SHOULD ASK YOU AGAIN.

YOU UNDERSTAND THAT THE POSSIBLE SENTENCE FOR

2
3

THIS MATTER IS NOT LESS THAN FIVE YEARS NOR MORE THAN

4

YOUR LIFE?

5

A.

YES.

6

Q.

IN THE STATE PRISON, TOGETHER WITH A FINE OF

7

UP TO $10,000?

DO YOU UNDERSTAND THE PENALTIES?

8

A.

YES, SIR.

9

Q.

DOES THAT MAKE ANY DIFFERENCE TO YOUR PLEA

10
11

THAT YOU PREVIOUSLY ENTERED?
A.

NO, SIR.

12
13

THE COURT:

ANY REASON WHY JUDGMENT SHOULD

NOT BE PRONOUNCED?

14

MR. NASH:

15

MR. FAMULARY:

NO, YOUR HONOR.
WE WOULD LIKE TO ADD A COMMENT

16

HERE ABOUT THE FACTS, THAT WE HAVE SOME INFORMATION

17

ABOUT WHAT HAPPENED HERE FROM TWO OR THREE PAGES OF

18

POLICE REPORTS AND STATEMENTS MADE.
APPARENTLY MR. GARDNER MET THE VICTIM AT THE

19
20

STORE.

MR. GARDNER HAD BEEN DRINKING QUITE HEAVILY

21

THAT NIGHT, AND HAVING BEEN SMOKING MARIJUANA, AND WAS

22

UNDER THE INFLUENCE OF THOSE DRUGS AT THE TIME THE

23

INCIDENT OCCURED.

24

RESIDENCE.

25

FRENCH KISSED HIM, WHICH UPSET MR. GARDNER, AND IN THE

THEY WENT TO MR. ABEGGLEN'S

MR. ABEGGLEN, ACCORDING TO MR. GARDNER,

1

HEAT OF PASSION KICKED HIM AND CAUSED SOME INJURY.

2

AND THEN APPARENTLY HE DIED FROM THAT BEATING THAT

3

RESULTED THEREFROM.

4

THE COURT:

5

THE WITNESS:

6

IS THAT THE WAY IT HAPPENED?
HE COMMITTED A HOMOSEXUAL ACT

AGAINST ME, AND I DON'T CARE FOR HOMOSEXUALS.

7

THE COURT:

3

THE WITNESS:

9

THE COURT:

10

THAT CAUSED YOU TO BECOME UPSET?

WERE YOU ACTING IN THE HEAT OF

PASSION AT THIS TIME?

11

THE WITNESS:

12

TH£ COURT:

13

YES.

NO, SIR.

I WAS --

DID YOU KNOW WHAT YOU WERE DOING

WHEN YOU WERE KICKING HIM?

14

THE WITNESS:

15

THE COURT:

16

MR. NASH:

NO.

I DIDN'T.

MR. NASH?
YOUR HONOR, I WOULD REPRESENT, AND

17

IT'S IN THE REPORTS BASED UPON THIS, THAT I UNDERSTAND

18

MR. FAMULARY RECOMMENDED HIS CLIENT, BASED UPON THIS

19

REPORT, THIS PLEA IS ENTERED.

20

AND THERE WAS, AN INITIAL STRIKING.

21

KNOCKED UNCONSCIOUS.

22

PUT HIS SHOES ON, GO GATHER UP SOME THINGS IN THE

23

HOUSE, TAKE SOME PERSONAL ITEMS BELONGING TO THE

24

VICTIM, THEN AS THE DEFENDANT WAS GETTING READY TO

25

LEAVE, THE VICTIM REGAINED CONSCIOUSNESS, TRIED TO GET

THERE MAY HAVE BEEN,
THE VICTIM WAS

THE DEFENDANT THEN HAD TIME TO

1

UP AND THE DEFENDANT THEN WENT BACK, AFTER HE HAD HAD

2

A CHANCE TO COOL OFF AND REALIZE WHAT WAS GOING ON,

3

AND ADMINISTER ANOTHER SEVERE BEATING WHICH RESULTED

4

IN THE DEATH OF THE VICTIM.

5

INSTANCE IN THE HEAT OF PASSION.

6

BEATING WHICH CAUSED THE DEATH, AND THESE FACTS HAVE

7

BEEN MADE CLEAR TO MR . FAMULARY.

8

TO WHICH THE DEFENDANT HIMSELF HAS ADMITTED IN AT

9

LEAST TWO STATEMENTS MADE TO POLICE OFFICERS.

10

THE COURT:

11

MR. FAMULARY:

IT WAS NOT DONE IN THIS
IT IS THE SECOND

THESE ARE THE FACTS

WHICH VERSION IS THE TRUE ONE?
THAT'S BASICALLY CORRECT.

12

SECOND TIME, FROM WHAT I GATHER FROM THIS POLICE

13

REPORT

14

SECOND BEATING.

15

AROUND AND COLLECT SOME OF THE VICTIM'S BELONGINGS

16

BEFORE THE SECOND TIME.

17

WAS THE SECOND TIME OF ONE KICK.

THE

IT WASN'T A

BUT HE DID HAVE AN OPPORTUNITY TO GO

THE COURT:

YOU UNDERSTAND WHAT YOU HAVE

13

DESCRIBED TO ME, MR. GARDNER, THE COUNTY ATTORNEY WILL

19

HAVE A DIFFICULT TIME MAKING OUT A CASE OF SECOND

20

DEGREE MURDER?

21
>2
!3
4
5

THE WITNESS :

YES.

I JUST DON'T WANT TO TAKE

IT THROUGH A TRIAL.
THE COURT:

WELL, BUT THE POINT WE HAVE TO

MAKE, YOU HAVE RIGHTS THAT HAVE TO BE PROTECTED.
THE WITNESS

YES, SIR.

THE COURT:

IF YOU ARE NOT GUILTY OF SECOND

DEGREE MURDER THIS COURT WON'T ACCEPT A PLEA OF SECOND
DEGREE MURDER.

NOW, WHAT THE COUNTY ATTORNEY

DESCRIBED TO ME THE JURY COULD VERY LOGICALLY CONCLUDE
THAT DOES MEET THE LIMITS OF A SECOND DEGREE MURDER,
IF THOSE ARE THE FACTS AS THEY OCCURED?
THE WITNESS:
THE COURT:

YES.
IT'S STILL YOUR DESIRE TO PLEAD

GUILTY TO THAT CHARGE?
THE WITNESS:
THE COURT:

YES.

ANY REASON WHY JUDGMENT SHOULD

NOT BE PRONOUNCED?
MR. NASH:

NO, YOUR HONOR.

MR. FAMULARY:
THE COURT:

NO, YOUR HONOR.

IN THIS MATTER THE COURT

SENTENCES MR. GARDNER TO SERVE A TERM AT THE UTAH
STATE PRISON, INDETERMINATE, NOT LESS THAN FIVE YEARS
AND NOT MORE THAN LIFE.

EXECUTION OF THE SENTENCE

WILL BE CARRIED OUT IMMEDIATELY.
MR. NASH:

THANK YOU, YOUR HONOR.

MR. FAMULARY:

THANK YOU.

(WHEREUPON THIS HEARING WAS CONCLUDED.)
*

* *

REPORTER'S CERTIFICATE

I, MILO N. HARMON, RPR, OFFICIAL COURT
REPORTER IN THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT, STATE OF
UTAH, DO HEREBY CERTIFY THAT THE ABOVE AND FOREGOING
PROCEEDINGS WERE BY ME STENOGRAPHICALLY REPORTED AT THE
TIMES AND PLACES HEREIN SET FORTH; THAT THE SAME WAS
SUBSEQUENTLY BY ME CAUSED TO BE REDUCED TO TYPEWRITTEN
FORM CONSISTING OF PAGES 1 THROUGH 13 BOTH INCLUSIVE;
AND THAT THE SAME CONSTITUTES A TRUE AND CORRECT
TRANSCRIPTION OF TESTIMONY GIVEN, EVIDENCE ADDUCED, AND
PROCEEDINGS HAD IN THE ABOVE-ENTITLED CAUSE.
TO WHICH CERTIFICATION I HEREBY SET MY HAND
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UINTAH COUNTY, UTAH

APR 2 1990
EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
UINTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

_ /J A . CLERK
PATttufrSWA,
BY ^ A . 5 T
DEPUTY

STATE OF UTAH,

Plaintiff,

DECISION

vs.
JAMES FRANKLIN GARDNER,

CASE NO.:

85CR28

Defendant.
A review of the testimony and the exhibits in this matter would
indicate:
1. The Defendant, James Franklin Gardner, first met the victim,
Rick Layne Abegglen, at a convenience store in Vernal on the evening of
March 5 1985. Prior to this, the Defendant had consumed significant
guantit es of alcohol and/or drugs. The Defendant and the victim went
to the apartment of a friend of the Defendant's (Sherry Richens) where
a small party was in progress. Later, the Defendant drove the victim
to the victim's apartment to obtain beer.
2. While the victim and the Defendant were alone at the victim's
apartment, the victim "grabbed" the Defendant and "kissed" or "french
kissed" the Defendant. Defendant responded to the kiss by pushing the
victim away and immediately kicking the victim with a "karate" kick to
the face.
3. The force of the kick knocked the victim unconscious; and,
while the victim laid unconscious on the floor, the Defendant held the
victim's head with one hand (to obtain leverage) and repeatedly struck
the victim in the face with the other hand.
4. The Defendant then left the victim, who was still unconscious,
and searched other areas of the victim's apartment for personal
property to take with him. As the Defendant was putting his shoes on,
(which he had removed upon first entering the apartment) the victim
began to regain consciousness. As the victim attempted to stand, and
rfhile the victim was still on his knees, the Defendant again kicked the
victim in the area of his neck and -hit and kicked him over and over".
5. Shortly after the second incident, the victim stopped
breathing and the Defendant attempted to resuscitate the victim by
pushing on the victim's chest and then by administering "mouth to
nouth" resuscitation. The victim died before the Defendant left the
apartment. The time of death was sometime between 12.10 a.m. and 3:00
a.m. on March 6, 1985.

6. There was no indication that the victim took any action
against the Defendant after the "kiss" described above. The victim was
unable to defend himself after the initial kick of the Defendant. In
describing the initial beating, the Defendant indicated "....I was
putting all the pressure on him, I was giving it all I had.M The
Defendant indicated that he was familiar with martial arts.
7. The Defendant then drove the victim's automobile from the
victim's apartment to Sherry Richens apartment arriving at the Richen's
apartment (some two miles away) at about 3:00 a.m. During the next
several hours the Defendant drove to the apartment of Clayton
Christensen (some two miles distance), arriving at about: 3:30 a.m.;
then drove to the home of an aunt, Velda Rasmussen, at Roosevelt, Utah
(some 30 miles distance) arriving at about 4:30 a.m.; then drove to the
home of his sister, Ilona Slim, at Myton, Utah (some 8 miles distance)
arriving at 6:30 a.m.; then drove to the home of his parents at
Whiterocks, Utah (approximately 20 miles distance) arriving at about
7:00 a.m.; then drove to the home of an aunt at Lapoint, Utah (more
than 10 miles distance) arriving at about 7:15 a.m.; then drove back to
the Richens apartment in Vernal, Utah (some 14 miles distance) arriving
at about 9:00 a.m. During this time, the Defendnat also drove to
Maeser, Utah (which would have been on his way from Lapoint to Vernal)
and received some money from a cousin, Don Hendricks.
8. Between 3:00 a.m. and 9:00 a.m. on March 6, 1985, the
Defendant described the events surrounding the death of Mr. Abegglen to
the following individuals: William Jaramillo, Sherry Richens, Robin
McCleary, Clayton Christensen, Jennifer Thomas, Velda Rasmussen, Carma
Gardner, Darrel Gardner, Avis Sparks, Daniel Aquilar, and Benjamin
Murray.
9. Although the statements of the Defendant to the police and as
reported by the above individuals, are not entirely consistent, it is
obvious that the Defendant possessed a recollection of the events which
lead to the death of the victim. These statements would support the
following: Defendant realized that he had been kissed; he recognized
the victim's actions as being offensive, and was offended; he was
physically capable of administering a beating to the victim and was
capable of making "karate" type kicking motions; he was capable of
forming an intent to search the apartment for items of value, did
search for valuables, and took several items with him when he left the
apartment; he was capable of finding and putting his shoes on; he was
physically able to administer additional force against the victim (the
"second beating"); he recognized that the victim had been seriously
injured and took steps to resuscitate the victim; he considered calling
for medical assistance; he recognized that the victim had died, and
realized that he was responsible for his death; he understood that he
could be imprisoned for causing the victim's death and decided to flee
to avoid the punishment; before leaving the apartment he was capable of
remembering that the keys to the victim's car had been left in the
ignition; he was capable of driving long distances in order to obtain
advice and monetary assistance from family and friends; and he was able
to effectively communicate with others in describing the events which
lead to the death of the victim.

10- The individuals who saw the Defendant after the victim's
death gave conflicting descriptions concerning his condition.
Individuals described Defendant as: upset, Mpretty drunk", "messed up"
(due to the consumption of alcohol or drugs), and as not being
intoxicated. At the hearing in this matter, the Defendant did not
claim to be so intoxicated that he was incapable of forming the
requisite intent for Second Degree Murder. There is no indication in
the statements that the Defendant gave the police or in his statements
to his friends and relatives that the Defendant was not capable of
forming the required intent. Indeed, a review of the Defendant's
statements and his actions (see #9 and #11) would suppor a finding that
he was capable of forming the intent.
11. On March 8, 1985, the Defendant gave two voluntary
statements, after being advised of his Miranda Rights, and waiving
those rights on each occasion. The statements describe his initial
meeting with the victim, relates conversations between the Defendant
and the victim during the course of the evening and early morning hours
of the next day, describes the various places the Defendant visited
during that time period, and relates the conversations and events which
lead to the death of Mr. Abegglen. After the "kiss", the Defendant's
recollection is not as complete as prior to that incident. Defendant
indicated that he "got real mad", "...I flipped out", "
It was as if
I couldn't stop", "...I just kept hitting him, I was screaming, I went
beserk, I couldn't control it, I couldn't stop hitting him". In these
statements, Defendant related two "beatings" which were separated by a
significant period of time during which the Defendant searched the
apartment for valuables and while he put on his shoes. (The Defendant
admitted to taking a blanket, coat, and two coins from the apartment).
In his testimony before this Court, the Defendant acknowledged that
there was a period of time which separated his acts of violence towards
the victim. The record would support a finding that there was adequate
time between the two incidents for the Defendant to recover from his
outrage of being "kissed".
12. The parties agreed to a plea bargain wherein the Defendant
would enter a plea as charged to Second Degree Murder and the
prosecutor would dismiss three Third Degree Felony Forgery charges
which were then pending in Circuit Court, not file First Degree Murder
charges in this case, not file an Auto Theft charge (which was based on
the taking of the victim's vehicle), and not file a "possible" Habitual
Criminal charge. On April 2, 1985 the Defendant waived his right to a
Preliminary Hearing and was taken to District Court where he entered a
plea of guilty.
13. At the time of the incident, the Defendant was on parole from
the State of Oregon. He had previously been convicted of a Third
Degree Felony in the State of Utah but had received probation for that
offense. When the plea was entered, both parties were unsure as to
whether the Defendant's record would support an increase in sentencing
under the Habitual Criminal Statute. The parties, therefore, agreed to
forego the filing of "a possible Habitual Criminal Charge".

14.

At the time of the plea:

A. The charges as contained in the Amended Information were
read to the Defendant by the Court. P 3. (However, the transcript
indicates that a portion of the statutory language for the depraved
indifference theory of Second Degree Murder was omitted when the Court
read the Information).
B.

The Defendant indicated that he beat the victim.

P 7.

C. The Defendant denied that he beat the victim with an
intent to cause his death or as an act clearly dangerous to human life
which caused his death. P 7.
D. The Defendant admitted that he engaged in conduct which
created a grave risk of death to another, and, therefore, caused the
death of another. P 7.
E. The Defendant indicated that he was entering his plea
because he was, in fact, guilty of the offense. P. 8.
F.

The Court accepted the plea.

P. 8.

G. The Defendant waived time for sentencing and requested
that he be immediately sentenced. P. 8.
H. At the sentencing portion of the hearing, the State
described the incident as a "severe beating" and recommended that the
maximum sentence be imposed. P. 9.
I. In his statement to the Court regarding sentencing,
counsel for the Defendant described the incident as occurring while the
Defendant was under the influence of alcohol and drugs and after the
Defendant had been "French Kissed". Counsel then characterized the
incident as occurring in the "heat of passion". P. 10 and 11.
J. The Court having received two different descriptions of
the facts, asked the Defendant if his attorney's characterization of
the events was accurate. P. 11.
K. The Defendant responded that the victim had committed a
homosexual act against him which caused him to become upset. The
Defendant, however, denied that he was acting in the heat of passion.
P. 11.
L. The Defendant then indicated that he did not know what he
was doing when he kicked the victim. P. 11. (There were two separate
incidents wherein the Defendant kicked the victim. The record does not
indicate which incident the Defendant was referring to. For the
purpose of this hearing, the Court will interpret this statement as an
indication that he did not know what he was doing on either occasion.)

M. The prosecutor then gave the Court the State's version of
the facts, which was: There was an initial incident where the
Defendant was knocked unconscious; after this initial incident, the
Defendant put on his shoes, gathered up some things in the house, and
took some personal items belonging to the victim, the victim then
regained consciousness and tried to get up, and after the Defendant had
a chance to cool off and realize what was going on, the Defendant
administered another severe beating which resulted in the death of the
victim. The prosecutor then indidcated that the second incident did
not occur in the heat of passion. P. 11 and 12.
N. Counsel for the Defendant acknowledged that the
prosecutor's version was basically correct except that the second
incident was not a beating, it was one kick. P. 12. (NOTE: The Court
views the facts as indicating that the attorney for the Defendant
abandoned his prior statements that the Defendant was intoxicated
and/or acted in the heat of passion. At the hearing to withdraw the
plea, the attorney for the Defendant explained that, since this
occurred at the sentencing stage of the hearing, he was merely trying
to characterize the actions of the Defendant in the most favorable
light possible and was not attempting to interpose defenses. Indeed,
the attorney for the Defendant indicated that he did not consider
intoxication or heat of passion as being viable defenses. A review of
the evidence available to counsel would indicate that the decision not
to rely upon these defenses was well within the wide range of trial
tactics which competent counsel may have selected in this situation.)
0. The Court then advised the Defendant that conviction
would be difficult under the facts which he had described (i.e. that he
did not know what he was doing when he kicked the victim). P 12.
P. The Defendant indicated that he understood that a
conviction would be difficult under the facts which he described but
expressed a desire to enter a plea rather than go to trial. P. 12.
Q. The Court then indicated that the facts as
the County Attorney would support a finding of guilty, M
the facts as they occurred." (i.e. that he had a chance
and realize what was going on before he administered the
beating.) P. 13.

described by
if those are
to cool off
second

R. The Defendant acknowledged that the statement of the
prosecutor was correct. P. 13.
S. The Defendant then indicated that he wished to enter a
plea of guilty and was sentenced. P. 13.
15. The Court views the record of the plea hearing as indication
that: the Defendant was aware that he could not be convicted if he did
not know what he was doing; the Defendant was also aware that Judge
Davidson would not accept a plea under the facts which he had
described; in spite of such knowledge, the Defendant desired to enter a
plea of guilty; the Defendant adopted the factual version of the
prosecutor with full knowledge of the consequences of his action; the
effect of his action in adopting the statement of the prosecutor was to
abandon his prior statement that he did not know what he was doing and

adopt a factual version which indicated that he knew what he was doing
when he initiated the second attack. This Court views the foregoing as
a waiver of the defense of heat of passion. In the context of the
Defendant's Motion, it is the opinion of this Court that the interest
of justice will riot be served by allowing the Defendant to attack the
plea on the basis that he had a valid defense. Mr. Famulary briefly
explained the defense of heat of passion to the Defendant. This and
the Court's explanation to the Defendant that he could not be found
guilty if he did not know what he was doing effectively communicated to
the Defendant the essence of the heat of passion defense. In so
holding, the Court notes that the Defendant's adoptive admissions are
consistent with the Defendant's statements to the police, his family
and friends and his statement to his counsel that he knew what he was
doing when he initiated the second attack upon the victim.
16. Mr. Famulary testified that he took a copy of the statute to
the jail and reviewed the statutory requrements for First and Second
Degree Murder (including the intent requirement under the deprave
indifference portion of the Second Degree Murder Statute). Mr.
Famulary testified that the Defendant would not enter a plea to a crime
which required a specific intent to cause the death of another. After
reviewing the statute with counsel, the Defendant decided to plead
guilty to the depraved indifference portion of the statute. Mr.
Famulary further testified that the Defendant indicated to him that he
knew what he was doing when he initiated the second attack upon the
victim (this is also consistent with the statements that the Defendant
gave the police). At the plea hearing, the Defendant first informed
the Court of his intent to enter a plea of guilty. Nevertheless, when
questioned concerning the first two ways of committing the offense, the
Defendant indicated that he was not guilty. It is obvious to this
Court that the Defendant was aware that there was another portion of
the statute which he was prepared to plead guilty to, a statutory
provision which did not require an intent to cause the death of
another. Based upon the above and a review of the evidence and after
listening to the evidence present at the hearing on the Defendant's
motion, the Court finds that, prior to attending the plea hearing, the
Defendant's attorney had advised the Defendant of the various ways that
homicide could be committed under the First and Second Degree Homicide
statutes, including the intent requirement under the depraved
indifference statute and that the Defendant was aware of the mental
element of the depraved indifference portion of the Second Degree
Murder Statute when he entered his plea.

17. The statement of the Defendant that he did not know what he
was doing when he kicked the victim, was treated as an indication that
the Defendant was acting in the heat of passion. This statement could
have also applied to the defense of intoxication. The Defendant has
never directly claimed that he was intoxicated to a degree that he
could not form the intent, and the Court's findings of waiver
(paragraph 15) are equally applicable to intoxication. Further, a
review of the Defendant's statements and actions before, during, and
after (paragraph 9 & 11)'would indicate that intoxication may have been
a difficult deferise to rely upon . Finally, the Court had received
statements from the Defendant at the plea hearing which would indicate
that the Defendant was capable of forming an intent in this case.
Q
A
Q
A

(Court) What did you do?
(Defendant) What did I do?
(Court) yes.
(Defendant) I beat him. P. 7.

Q (Court) Is that the way it happened?
A (Defendant) He committed a homosexual act against me, and I
don't care for homosexuals.
Q (Court) That caused you to become upset?
A (Defendant) yes.
P. 11.
The above statements indicate an awareness that is inconsistent
with the defense of intoxication. Defndant knew a homosexual advance
had been made, was offended and became upset, and was physically
capable of administering a severe beating which caused the death of the
victim. The adoption of the Defendant of the prosecutor's statements
also indicate an awareness which is inconsistent with the defense of
Intoxication. The ability of the Defendant to form the intent to
search the apartment and take property and his actions before, during,
and after the death of the victim would support a finding that he could
form the required intent.
18. While the Defendant was incarcerated and before his plea, he
was visited by a social worker, Tina Gurule. During the time she
visited with Defendant, she reported that his condition would vary from
day to day. She did not see the Defendant on the date of his plea.
However, the Trial Judge did see and converse with the Defendant at the
time the plea was taken. There is nothing on the record which would
indicate that he was unable to enter a plea. He indicated to the Court
that he was not on medication. His responses were appropriate, and the
Judge found that his plea was knowingly made. The family of the
Defendant were present at the time of the plea* Neither the family or
bhe social worker informed counsel of any concerns about the
Defendant's ability to enter a plea. Therefore, the Court finds that
bhe Defendant was capable of entering a knowing and voluntary plea and
vas not incapacitated at the time that the plea was entered.

19. The record indicates that the Defendant was advised by the
Court of the penalty for the offense of Second Degree Murder and
indicated to the Court that he understood the penalty.
20. The Defendant claims that counsel for the Defendant was
incompetent in not investigating the facts further to determine whether
the first or second incident caused the death of the victim. The
statements of the Defendant indicated that the victim was alive after
the first incident, had 'regained consciousness, and was in the process
of rising. The evidence further indicates that the victim stopped
breathing almost immediately after the second incident. The medical
examiner's report classified the death as a homicide and listed the
cause of death as "multiple craniocerebal injuries, blunt force trauma
to the head". Under the circumstances, where the Defendant had been
involved in two incidents which were closely related in time, it would
be virtually impossible to medically determine which of the attacks
caused the death or whether it was a combination of the two. Defendant
has not presented any evidence that additional investigation would have
uncovered information which is exculpatory. Mr. Famulary testified
that he believed that a jury may conclude that it was the second attack
which caused the death. He reasoned that a jury could logically
conclude that, since the victim survived the first attack but died
immediately after the second attack, the victim died as a result of the
second attack. The Court finds this to be a decision which is within
the broad range of choices that competent counsel may have made in
undertaking the defense.
21. A review of the evidence indicates that the Defendant was not
specifically informed of his right not to incriminate himself. The
record, however, indicates the Defendant had previously been advised of
his right not to incriminate himself on two separate occasions (i.e.
prior to each statement to the police) and had waived this right on
both occasions. Further, at the hearing in this matter, the Defendant
did not claim that he was unaware of the right or that he would have
acted differently if he would have been advised of his right to remain
silent. Under these circumstances, the Court finds that the Defendant
has failed to establish any"affect that this had on the plea. A review
of the record indicates that the Defendant was determined to conclude
this matter by entering a plea. He expressed his desire to end this
matter quickly to the police, his family, his attorney, and the Court.
The record indicates that he was determined to plead even after being
informed that his version of the facts raised a defense. After a
reivew of the evidence, this Court finds that the Defendant was not
prejudiced by the Court's failure to remind him of his right to remain
silent.

22. A review of the Defendant's statements to the police and the
statements of various witnesses who the Defendant had communicated with
tfould also indicate that the decision of counsel not to rely upon the
defense of intoxication or heat of passion was within the wide range of
tactic which competent counsel may have under this situation. The
ability of the Defendant to remember the events which lead up to and
caused the death of the "victim, his ability to form the intent to
search for valuables and to take persona property from the residence,
lis ability to remember where the keys were, his ability to perform
*arate type kicking motions, his ability to communicate with others
Immediately after the death of the victim, his ability to drive long
listances, and the time involved between the first and second incident,
all make these defenses difficult,
23. After listening to the witnesses in this matter, the Court is
convinced that it was the desire of the Defendant to enter the plea
without a trial. Counsel for Defendant reviewed the police reports and
verified the information to be true through conversation with the
)efendant. His review of the facts indicated that the Defendant was
ware of his actions when he caused the death of Mr. Abegglen. The
statements of the Defendant to police and others gave the police
sufficient evidence to bring a strong case against the Defendant. The
)efendant faced three other felonies at that time and could have been
:harged with Aggravated Burglary, Aggravated Robbery, and Auto Theft.
?he State was also considering a charge of Capital Homicide. Under
;hese facts, it was within the wide range of competency for defense
:ounsel to follow the wishes of his client in entering this plea.
24. At the hearing to withdraw the plea, the Defendant testified
:hat he did not understand what Judge Davidson meant when he asked him
.f this occurred in the "heat of passion". Defendant testified he
>elieved Judge Davidson was asking if this occurred while the parties
rere involved in a homosexual act. The Defendant further testified
;hat he became upset and that he and Judge Davidson had a dialog
concerning the meaning of "heat of passion". The discussion that the
defendant refers to is not part of the transcribed record. Mr.
'amulary testified that the record was complete, and this Court finds
hat it is complete. In any event, even assuming the Defendant's
ersion, he was fully aware that Judge Davidson was not accusing him of
ieing a homosexual before they went back on the record.
25. Under the facts of this case, there is no theoretical
ifference between a plea of guilty and a nolo plea. The Defendant
learly was willing to submit himself to the sentence authorized by the
tatute. He admitted to facts which establish the elements of the
ffense under the statute; and, the facts which he admitted were
onsistent and supported by the admissions that he had made to the
olice, his friends and family, and to his attorney.

26. The Defendant's statement to Judge Davidson that he did not
intend to cause the death of the victim is consistent with his plea
under the depraved indifference portion of the Second Degree Murder
Statute- State v. Fontana, 680 P2d 1042 requires that the Defendant
must be aware that his conduct created a grave risk to another. As
indicated above, the Defendant was specifically informed that it would
be difficult to convict him if he did not know what he was doing. He
was informed that before he could be convicted the State must show that
he knowingly participated in conduct which created a grave risk of
death to another: Nevertheless, after being informed that the Court
would not accept a plea :if he was not guilty, the Defendant adopted the
statement of the County-Attorney. A review of the Defendant's actions
as set forth in paragraph #11 above and of the prosecutor's statement
would support the Court's conclusion that the Defendant had knowingly
participated in conduct created a grave risk of death, while evidencing
a depraved indifference to human life.
27. In this matter, the Defendant claims that the plea bargain
was illusory. The Defendant claims that the prosecution threatened to
charge him as a Habitual Criminal. As indicated previously, the
parties were unsure of whether the Defendant's prior record would
support a charge under the Habitual Criminal Statute. As indicated
previously, the Defendant was brought before the Court to enter a plea
at his own insistence and prior to the time when either party had been
able to sort out the facts concerning the Oregon conviction. The
record now indicates that the Defendant's record would not have
supported a Habitual Criminal charge. However, the State never
indicated that it had facts which would support the charge. This was
merely a possible charge which was cleared up in the process of the
plea bargain. At the plea hearing, the State indicated: "In addition
to that the State is foregoing the filing of an Auto Theft charge and a
possible Habitual Criminal charge, which the Auto Theft charge may
allow or may have allowed." This is also consistent with defense
counsel's recollection of the plea bargaining negotiations. Under
these circumstances, the plea was not illusory. The State merely
indicated that they felt a Habitual Criminal charge may have been
possible. There is no indication that the State did not act in good
faith in its belief that this was a possible charge. Further, the
statements of the Defendant at the hearing on this motion, make it
clear that he was only concerned (understandably) about the filing of
capital homicide charges. The Defendant clearly did not rely upon the
Habitual Criminal charges in entering into the plea agreement. The
agreement to forego the Capital Homicide charges was the "key issue"
and "the only thing that mattered". The Court finds that there was no
misrepresentation"made to the Defendant concerning the filing of
Habitual Criminal charges. Further, the dismissal of those charges was
merely an attempt to cl?2ar up all possible pending charges within
Uintah County and was/not a concession which the Defendant relied upon
in entering his plear and was not illusary.

28. The Defendant also claims that the State's offer to not file
a Capital Homicide charge was illusory. As indicated above, the
Defendant did rely upon the State's promise to not charge him with a
capital offense. Although the Defendant has consistently maintained
that he did not intend to kill the victim, a jury may choose not to
believe his self serving statements. If a jury decided that the
Defendant's characterization of his intent was not credible, the facts
which surround the second incident could support a determination that
the Defendant intended to cause the death of the victim. This would
certainly be an issue for the jury to resolve. The case of State vs.
Tillman, 750 P2d 546, makes it clear that all the State needs to prove
is that the Defendant committed the homicide in connection with another
listed crime. It is not necessary to show that the homicide was
committed in futherance or to facilitate the listed crime. State vs.
Bradley, 752 P2d 874, may also be applicable in this case in support of
Aggravated Burglary as a crime to support the charge of First Degree
Murder. Although it is clear in this case that the Defendant entered
the apartment with consent, his intrusion into other areas of the
apartment after kicking the victim with a karate kick and servely
beating the victim with his fist may support Aggravated Burglary as a
supporting offense. Similarly, the use of such force and the
subsequent removal of personal property from the apartment may justify
the charge of Aggravated Robbery as a supporting offense. See State
vs. Glymph 563 P2d 422 (Kansas); State vs. Carcerano, 390 P2d 923
(Or.); People v. Bartowsheski; 661 P2d 235 (Col); and State v.
Ulibarui; 668 P2d 568. Where force is used to render the victim
unconscious, a jury may conclude that the property was taken against
the will of the owner. A review of the facts in this case which were
available to the prosecution would indicate that the State could have,
in good faith, believed that a Capital Homicide charge was viable. It
is not necessary for this Court to decide whether or not the State
would have been successful in bringing a First Degree Murder case. The
record indicates that the prosecution was proceeding in good faith and
that the theory of the State's case was supported by facts which could
support a juries determination of guilty.
The Defendant entered his plea in order to avoid the risks of
facing a First Degree Murder charge. As a result of the plea, the
State did not go forward on other felony charges which the State had
brought or could have brought. In this case, the Defendant freely
admits that he is guilty of some form of criminal homicide. The issue
was never whether the Defendant was guilty of a criminal act which
caused the death of another, it was always which form of criminal
homicide Defendant was guilty of. The State believed the facts would
support a finding of guilt under the First Degree Murder Statute. The
Defendant believed he was not guilty of that offense. The parties
settled upon a plea to Second Degree Murder. At the time he entered
his plea, the Defendant had been informed by counsel of the elements of
the crime that he plead to (including the intent element). Judge
Davidson had informed the Defendant that he could not be found guilty
if he did not know what he was doing when he kicked the victim. The
statements of the Defendant (i.e. the adoptive statement at the time of
the plea, his statements to the police and others, and his statement to
tiis attorney that he knew what he was doing) are all consistent with
his plea. (This is not a case like State v. Breckenridge, 688 P2d 440,
tfhere there is nothing in the record to support the Defendant's plea.
\s Judge Davidson observed, the statement of the prosecutor would
support a finding of guilty. This is more akin to the facts in Hurst

After taking advantage of the State's offer, the Defendant now is
not satisfied with his agreement and wishes to withdraw his plea. In
doing so he appeals to the Court's sense of justice and fair play.
This Court is not convinced justice would be well served in this case
by allowing the Defendant to renege on his agreement. This would place
a tremendous burden on tlhe State to resurrect several cases (including
the Forgery cases) which are long since stale. It also denies the
State the benefit of its bargain.
Based upon a review of all of the evidence, the Court finds that
the Defendant was adequately represented and that his plea was
knowingly and voluntarily entered with full knowledge of its
consequences. The Court further finds that the plea bargain was not
illusory and that the Defendant is bound by his agreement. The Motion
of the Defendant is, therefore, denied.
DATED this 2nd day of April, 1990.
BY THE COURT:

A. LYNN PAYNE, CIRCUIT COURT JUDGE
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